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Welfare Impacts of Electricity Generation Sector Reform in the Philippines 
Natsuko Toba* 
Sidney Sussex College, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, CB2 3HU, UK 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper reports an empirical investigation into the welfare impacts of an 
introduction of private sector participation into the Philippines electricity generation 
sector, by liberalizing the market for independent power producers (IPPs) during the 
power crisis of 1990-1993.  This study uses a social cost and benefit analysis.  The 
main benefits came from IPPs, who contributed to resolving the crisis, and promoted 
economic and social development.  Consumers and investors are net gainers, while 
the Government lost and there was an air pollution cost.   The paper concludes that 
the reform with private sector participation increased social welfare. 
 
JEL Classification: O10; D61; L50; L10; L94. 
Key words: Electricity; Cost-benefit-analysis; Institutional change. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Sector reform has been a major pillar of policy agendas across the world since 1980.  
Common reasons across all sectors are government failure and financial crisis, 
institutional failure, technological advancement and the globalisation of the world 
economy.  The increasing private sector involvement in government activities such as 
infrastructure services, assumes that resources are better allocated through the market 
mechanism in a competitive and decentralized environment than through the highly 
centralized and bureaucratic decisions of government.  There has been an ongoing 
debate on the superiority of performance between private and government owned 
enterprises.  This paper reports a social cost and benefit analysis to contribute to this 
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debate on the ownership effects on social welfare, focusing on the electricity 
generation sector in the Philippines. 
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief background to the 
Philippines electricity sector.  Section 3 briefly discusses the theoretical and empirical 
review surrounding the issue of ownership effects. Section 4 discusses the 
methodology used in this paper.  Section 5 details the data.  Section 6 describes the 
scenarios.  In section 7 the results are presented and discussed. And the final section 8 
concludes. 
 
2. Background to the Philippines electricity sector  
 
2.1 Generation Sector Profile  
 
In 1999, the country’s electric generation capacity was 12 GW, electricity generation 
was 40,745 GWh1 and electricity consumption was 37,900GWh (US Energy 
Information Agency, 2002).  In 1998, the electricity generat ion (41,192 GWh)2 mix 
by fuel type was Oil based 47.01%, Imported coal 19.23%, Local coal 3.89%, Hydro 
10.25%, Geothermal 19.57% and Natural gas 0.05%.  In 1998, total installed capacity 
(11,788.6MW) by fuel type consisted of Oil based 48.15%, Imported coal 8.91%, 
Local coal 7.21%, Hydro 19.54%, Geothermal 16.17% and Natural gas 0.03%; of this 
total, small island grids shared only 1.47% (Oil based 1.46% and Hydro 0.02%) 
(Department of Energy (DOE) (of The Philippines), 1999).  The Philippines has tried 
to reduce its dependence on fuel imports.   The country’s 8% of self supply of total 
energy mix in 1973 increased to over 40% by 1997.  The only indigenous energy 
resource that merits significant investment is geothermal steam. The proportion of 
imported oil to total energy was reduced from 92% in 1973 to 50% in 1999 (DOE, 
2000).  The share of indigenous oil within the total energy mix was expected to 
increase from 0.11% in 1998 to 2.18% in 2009, contributed by the Malampaya off 
                                                 
1
 Consisted of  (65% thermal, 19% hydro, 16% Geothermal, Solar, Wind, Wood, and Waste). 
2
 International Energy Agency: Energy Balance of Non-OECD Countries, 1997-1998 (n.d.), in 
documents obtained from Japan Electric Power Information Center (JEPIC) (n.d.). 
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shore field (DOE, 1999, 2000).  The average annual electricity generation growth 
from 1973 (10,910 GWh) to 2000 (40,700 GWh) was about 5.3%.3 
 
2.2 Historical Context 
 
Under the macroeconomic stabilization program of the mid 1980s introduced by 
President Aquino after the fall of the Marcos government, an overall public sector 
investment in the Philippines economy was cut back sharply.  In 1986, the energy 
investment was only 30% of the 1979 level in constant prices.  Furthermore, the 
government decided to mothball its one nuclear power plant which had received most 
of the recent investment and which had been designed to meet an increasing power 
demand.  As a result, since 1988, the Philippines had experienced a major crisis in 
electricity supply due to generating capacity deficits, which greatly affected national 
economic and social development and stability.  At the depths of the crisis in 1992-
1993, brownouts averaging seven hours per day were common in many regions of the 
country, hurting industrial production and the development of new and commercial 
activities which were on course for recovery with the new government.   In Luzon, 
brownouts occurred for 4-8 hours per day and in Mindanao, for up to 12 hours per 
day.   These brownouts led to unemployment and economic loss, estimated at 1.5% of 
GDP per year by the World Bank4 and at US$1-1.3 billion by the business community 
(in 1993 prices) (World Bank, 1993).  Many essential services were jeopardized both 
directly and indirectly, as it not only caused a lack of electricity for reading, cooking 
or entertainment but also interrupted other key services that depended on electricity 
such as traffic management, pumped water and sewerage (World Bank, 1993, pp.2-3).  
The real annual GDP growth rate fell from 6.1% in 1989 to –0.99% in 1991 and was 
0.72% in 1992 (DOE, 1999).  With the stabilization of power situation in 1994, the 
economy posted the real annual GDP growth rate of 4.4% (DOE, 1999).  The power 
crisis also stimulated the development of many inefficient and expensive self 
generators.  To mitigate the shortages, some 1600 MW generation capacity of gensets 
is known to have been imported to the Philippines during 1993 (World Bank, 1994a, 
p.10).   
 
                                                 
3
 Calculated from the data in 1973 from DOE (1999) and in 2000 from US Energy Information Agency 
(2002). 
4
 Estimated by the World Bank  (1993, p.2), using US 50 cent/KWh as the cost of unserved energy. 
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The main causes of this crisis were, inter alia; (i) rapid growth of electricity demand, 
(ii) mothballing of a completed nuclear plant without alternative generation capacity; 
(iii) the lack of Government equity infusion into the government-owned generation 
and transmission monopoly National Power Corporation (NPC) and the lack of a 
long-term debt instrument in the domestic financial system; (iv) inordinate delays in 
implementing new base load plants and in environmental clearances due to the public 
protests; (v) declining hydro power generation capacity; (vi) insufficient maintenance 
of ageing power plants causing frequent and prolonged outages; (vii) the recent new 
regulations standardizing (e.g., salary conditions, etc.) all the administration of 
Government agencies including NPC; and (viii) the recent politicised tariff adjustment 
process which constrained NPC’s financial capability even further. 
 
Ironically, the crisis followed the Government’s substantial steps to strengthen NPC 
both operationally and financially.  Moreover, because its existing capacity was 
considered sufficient to meet projected increases in demand through to about 1991, 
although NPC did have sufficient lead time to implement least cost additions to its 
generating capacity, it did not make use of the time to invest in its needed new 
capacity. 
 
Just before the power crisis, the Government had promulgated Executive Order (EO) 
215 of 10 July 1987 to end NPC’s generation monopoly which was designated to 
accommodate the Philippines National Oil Company (PNOC), which could not sell 
the geothermal steam which it was developing to NPC because the Government’s 
required royalty on this resource raised the cost of geothermal steam powered 
electricity well above that of coal and oil fired alternatives (World Bank, 1994a).  As 
the power crisis deepened and private development came to be viewed as the only 
viable approach for quickly addressing the shortages, the Government developed a 
fully fledged plan for privatizing the power sector, by rewriting exclusionary laws, 
drafting new policies to support IPPs, streamlining clearance processes, restructuring 
the Government energy sector policy departments and regulatory agencies, and 
removing the constraints to broader participation of IPPs in Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) and similar arrangements.  In that context, it developed a legal framework to 
enable foreign investors to win and operate generating facilities.  
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The issuance of EO 215 laid the foundation for private sector participation in the 
Philippines (World Bank, 1994a).  Rules and regulations, and Congressional 
endorsement, were given in 1989.  It was subsequently legislated as Republic Act 
(RA) No. 6957, dated 9 July 1990 (World Bank, 1994a).  The policy objectives of this 
act are to (i) recognize the indispensable role of the private sector for infrastructure 
development, and (ii) provide the most appropriate incentives to mobilize private 
resources for financing the construction, operation and maintenance of appropriate 
infrastructure projects, and freeing the Government from financing and undertaking 
such projects (World Bank, 1994a).  Also, under the “Electric Power Crisis Act of 
1993”, the President granted special powers to solve the energy crisis, such as 
facilitation of tariff increases, acceleration of project approvals, and salary 
improvements for technical staff in the sector (World Bank, 1993). 
 
Since the successful commissioning of the first IPP project (a 210 MW Hopewell 
Navotas gas turbine project) in 1991 that NPC contracted via a negotiated process, the 
Philippines has successfully attracted further private offers for power generation (e.g., 
about US$ 5 billion in 1994 prices in foreign investments between 1992 and March 
1994) (World Bank 1994a) .  NPC has continued to implement various types of 
scheme for IPPs, including BOT, Build-Own-Operate (BOO), Build-Transfer-Operate 
(BTO), Rehabilitate-Operate-Lease (ROL), Rehabilitate-Operate-Maintain (ROM) 
and Operate-Lease (OL) providing a total capacity in excess of 3500 MW and 
completing installation of 1300 MW by 1993 (World Bank, 1994a).  Most of the early 
IPP projects were made via solicited and unsolicited proposals followed by negotiated 
arrangements, although competitive bidding procedures were introduced later.  In 
1997, IPP generation increased to 46.3 % of total generation or about 35 IPPs.  By the 
end of 1996, the private sector had completed 3,270 MW of installed capacity on a 
mostly BOT or BOO basis.  An additional 5,655 MW of power plant capacity had 
either been contracted or was under negotiation with the IPPs and was scheduled for 
completion between 1997 and 2004.  The private sector had also become involved in 
the rehabilitation and operation of a number of NPC’s power plants.  As of 31 
December 1996, private participation in the operation of power plants with a total 
installed capacity of 1,299 MW had been arranged under ROL and ROM contracts.  
In addition, the NPC Power Development Plan as of December 1996 had provided for 
distribution utilities such as Meralco to make arrangements with the IPPs for the 
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construction of power plants with a total installed capacity of 11,274 MW (ADB, 
1997). 
 
The Government’s introduction of private participation in the electricity sector was 
indeed a major success in ending the power crisis, and its approved IPP contracts have 
contributed to the improvement of the environment for foreign investment in the 
Philippines as a whole.  To put an end to the crisis, “fast track” plants were 
constructed.  Most of the “fast track” plants were gas turbines, which are 
characterized by the low capital cost, short construction period, and high operational 
costs typical of peaking facilities.  However, for these additions to capacity to meet 
unmet demand, they were run at plant factors more appropriate for base load facilities.  
As these were the first investments by IPPs in the Philippines, the Government 
offered generous terms and favourable risk-sharing arrangements.  Under power 
purchase agreements (PPAs) in these early projects, NPC assumed market, fuel 
supply, location, and foreign exchange risks, with the Government providing a 
performance undertaking on behalf of the NPC.  Terms of PPA included Government 
guaranteed commercial obligations of NPC and off-take through take or pay 
provision, and substantive incentives to exceed that off-take and thereby run the 
facility as a base load or intermediate plant.  Most of these early projects were 
undertaken at a time of relatively stable exchange rates.  The sustainability of these 
PPAs tended to become vulnerable in case of major shocks such as the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 as they lacked appropriate mitigating mechanisms and procedures in 
dealing with such circumstances (Stern, 2001). 
 
In addition to the high cost of gas turbines whose direct operational costs were very 
high, payments were 90% or more based on capacity due to the high utilization 
factors to alleviate the power shortage.  Thus, these high cost plants needed to be 
operated in very low utilization factors once appropriate base plants become 
commissioned.  IPP plants were neither cheaper nor more fuel-efficient than NPC 
plants.  This was justifiable since the “fast track” projects’ reduction in power outages 
avoided large costs to the economy.   
 
However, after the end of the power crisis, although later IPP projects became less 
expensive and regulation over them has improved, IPP contracts which are still 
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unfavourable to NPC have been exacerbating the NPC’s already chronically weak 
financial position.  The regional economic crisis since 1997 especially hit NPC 
because a considerable proportion of payments to IPPs is denominated in foreign 
currency.  The decreased energy demand due to the crisis meant that NPC had to run 
the IPP’s costly plants at relatively high capacity utilization factors due to the take or 
pay contracts instead of running their own cheaper plants at higher capacity.  As a 
result, the external balance of Government deteriorated to the extent that it could no 
longer continue to guarantee these projects.  Although the electricity tariff settings to 
the distribution sector and its customers are highly politicised, involving multiple 
levels of cross subsidy, these prices had to be increased as a result.  These 
developments in turn caused a further deterioration of the already financially and 
operationally weak distribution sector.  The subsequent increasing oil prices and 
political turmoil after the crisis of 1997 put the Philippines electricity sector further 
into dire straits. 
 
These trends toward increased private development in the power sector, taken 
together, indicated that a major transformation in the structure of the power sector had 
already taken place.  While the Government was addressing many constraints to 
private sector led growth in this sector, little attention has been paid to ensuring that 
the resulting structural framework would serve the national interest.   
 
The Government has been considering a further radical reform and the eventual 
privatization of the entire power sector for a few decades.  Many proposals and 
studies have been made of alternative structural models for reform.5  The present 
arrangements of the electric power sector are putting major financial, operational and 
institutional constraints on Government capacity to maintain a stable, efficient, and 
cost-effective sector.  This was even further aggravated by the regional financial and 
the country’s political crises since 1997.  Introducing competitive electricity markets 
will lead to an improvement of governance related to additional supply capacity, a 
shift of the market risk to the private sector, removal of the heavy financial burden 
from the public sector, and a downward pressure on power tariffs.  The Government 
                                                 
5
 For example, Stubbs and Macatangay (2002) analysed the British experience of electricity sector 
privatisation to provide lessons learnt for the Philippines. 
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expects that the resultant efficiency gains will enhance the export competitiveness of 
the country’s industries. 
 
The current partial privatization of the generation sector is incomplete with many 
problems as explained above.  However, nobody has actually questioned and 
quantified the extent to which this was costly or beneficial to society as a whole.  It 
would be useful to evaluate this partial privatization, so as to give some insight to the 
sector reform and total privatization still pending as well as to indicate useful lessons 
to be learnt.  
 
3. Theoretical and empirical review on ownership effects 
 
Pollitt (1997) discusses several approaches to examine differences in performance 
between private and government owned electricity enterprises, whose literature is 
dominated by direct comparisons of performance between private and government 
owned electric utilities (e.g., Pollitt, 1995).  The approaches include analysis based 
on: (i) financial and physical indicators (e.g., Yarrow, 1992); ii) labour productivity or 
total factor productivity (TFP) (e.g., Haskel and Szymanski, 1992), and iii)  frontier 
analysis (e.g., Burns and Weyman-Jones, 1994), such as data envelopment analysis.  
All these approaches are, however, partial approaches to welfare measurement.  
 
The number of studies focused on welfare impacts is small compared to the other 
approaches.  There are two studies on poverty and consumer impacts of the 
Philippines electricity sector reform (Asian Development Bank (ADB), 1998; 
Navigant, 2001).  The poverty impacts assessment study assumes, inter alia, subsidy 
removal; National Power Corporation (NPC) will not retain all their employees; and 
competition will generate efficiency gains.  The consumer impacts assessment 
analysed partial equilibrium effects as a short term assessment and general 
equilibrium effects as a long term assessment.  The main assumptions adopted are 
subsidy removal and that price will reach a long-run marginal cost (LRMC) plus a 
universal levy of P0.23/KWh.6   A study on Argentinean electricity sector reform also 
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 A universal charge through Electricity Regulatory Commission (ERC) is to be imposed to meet costs 
associated with missionary electrification, usage of indigenous resources, environmental cost, removal 
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analysed general equilibrium effects and efficiency gains were estimated based on a 
few years of data after the privatization of the electricity service utilities (Chisari et 
al., 1999).  These studies analysed the welfare impacts of electricity sector reform but 
do not provide a pure measure of difference in performance between government 
owned and private electricity enterprises.  This is because these studies did not 
analyse the differences in performance between privatized enterprises under the sector 
reform and the state owned enterprises going through the comparable sector reform.  
Social cost and benefit analyses of the electricity sector reform in Chile (Galal et al., 
1994) and UK (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997; Domah and Pollitt, 2001) did analyse such 
difference.  This social-cost-benefit-analysis (SCBA) basically designs a behavioural 
and cost model of an industry and simulates it over the post privatization period with 
and without the sundry changes attributed to the privatization. Thus a counterfactual 
scenario (viz., enterprise without divestiture) is constructed to serve as control group 
as opposed to an actual scenario (viz., enterprise with divestiture) as treatment group.  
We adapt this methodology. 
   
Many theoretical and empirical studies conclude that while they support superior 
performance of private enterprises, ownership is not per se a major determinant of 
differences in efficiency and social welfare, as discussed in Pollitt (1995).  The 
institutional changes associated with private sector participation/ownership could also 
affect the differences.  We caution that, while frequent progress evaluations are 
necessary, the private sector participation/ownership phenomenon could be too recent 
to distinguish between the outcomes derived from the legacy of the past state 
ownership regime and those from the private sector participation/ownership.   
 
4. The SCBA Methodology 
 
Galal, et al. (1994)
 
identify three main groups in society, viz., consumers, private 
producers, and government as their framework in assessing the impacts of 
privatization on the economy.  A full social cost and benefit analysis can, in theory, 
address the impact on economic efficiency and equity.  Our first objective is to 
                                                                                                                                         
of cross subsidies, and NPC’s and distributors’ stranded liabilities upon privatization (Government of 
the Philippines, 2001). 
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answer the question: Does the cost of introducing IPPs warrant the current benefit 
gained by the society?  We shall then address the distributional aspect of the problem: 
Who gained and who lost in the process of private sector participation?  The former 
question concerns the productive efficiency and environmental impacts of the IPP 
participation and the latter issues related to equity.  
 
The general approach we take is to set up and compare two scenarios: NPC and IPP. 
Under the NPC scenario we make assumptions associated with NPC continuing to 
control the vast majority of new generation under public ownership. Under the IPP 
scenario we make various assumptions about the introduction of private sector 
participation in electricity generation. Comparison of these two scenarios (with 
associated sensitivity analysis) allows us to put a value on the policy of  introducing 
IPPs into the Phillipines. In line with Galal et al (1994) can broadly  think of the NPC 
scenario as involving continuing government operation and the IPP scenario as 
involving private operation. 
 
We followed the fundamental methodology of Jones et al. (1990): 
 
∆W = Vsp-Vsg+(λg-λp)Z, where                                                    (1) 
∆W = change in social welfare 
Vsp = social value under private operation 
Vsg = social value under continued government operation 
λg = shadow multiplier on government funds 
λp = shadow multiplier on private funds 
Z = actual price at which sale is executed. 
 
The given reform will increase social welfare if ∆W is positive.   
 
Alternatively, the welfare change can be expressed as a distributional function as in 
equation (2) below, which is adapted from Galal et al.
 
(1994): 
 
 ∆W = ∆S+∆pi+∆G+∆L+∆E                                                                                        (2)  
where, 
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∆S = change in consumer surplus and avoided cost 
∆pi = change in private (investors’) profit  
∆G = change in effects on government via income and tax  
∆L = change in effects on providers of inputs, of which labour is the most important 
∆E = change in externalities cost - effects on others arising from impacts on 
environment and natural resources, i.e., air pollution costs. 
 
The above formula (2) defines the NPV of change in welfare as the sum of the NPV 
of changes in welfare for each of the groups directly (as in a partial equilibrium 
model) affected by the private sector participation in the generation sector.  The 
resulting impact on social welfare is calculated firstly without giving social weights 
and then by giving two different sets of social weights taken from different sources.  
Social weights recognize a different social value of each monetary unit of 
consumption by each agent. 
 
Before the estimation of distributional social welfare effects using the model 
postulated (2) above, the net welfare impact was estimated by constructing a model as 
follows: 
 
∆W = ∆I+∆E+∆R, where,                                                                 (3) 
 ∆I = change in investment cost (capital, coal and oil) 
∆E = change in externalities cost (air pollution cost from oil and coal - different plant 
types, e.g., gas turbine, imported or domestic coal, and from geothermal, hydro, etc.)  
∆R = change in restructuring cost (controllable cost, avoided cost and privatization 
and subsidization cost).  
 
The elements of the welfare functions in (2) and (3) are discussed in section 5 below. 
5. Data 
 
Our dataset covers the pre- and post-private participation periods over at least 5-10 
years.  All data are disaggregated and detailed as much as possible.   Most of the data 
and information used for our SCBA were collected from a fieldwork study in the 
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Philippines, whereby a number of different locations were visited including: 
government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international 
organizations, universities, and private companies.  Data have also been collected 
from sources outside the Philippines. 
 
      We have data from 1988 up to 1997 (some are from 1983 and some are up to 2000). 
Based on these data, we made projections until 2010 although some projections go 
further than this time frame.  Based on the data and documents, actual and 
counterfactual scenarios were constructed.   We shall refer to the actual scenario as 
‘IPP scenario (the generation sector shared between NPC and IPPs)’ and the 
counterfactual as ‘NPC scenario (the generation sector continuing NPC monopoly)’.   
 
5.1 Controllable cost 
 
Generation is now shared between NPC and IPPs but transmission is still an NPC 
monopoly.  Thus we firstly reconstructed the accounts of the generation and 
transmission sectors, for the actual IPP scenario, by consolidating the accounts of 
NPC and IPPs, and for the counterfactual NPC scenario, by estimating the ‘would-
have-been’ NPC accounts without IPPs.   
 
Efficiency gains are examined in terms of savings in controllable cost following 
Newbery and Pollitt (1997), whose cost includes such costs as manpower related cost, 
operating and maintenance cost including materials and services, but excludes costs of 
fuel, depreciation, depletion,7 local government tax and provision of doubtful debts. 
The major data required and details to estimate controllable costs are presented in 
Table 1.  It was estimated that NPC’s controllable cost would have been about 14.6% 
higher than IPPs’ if NPC plants had been constructed instead of IPPs during the crisis.  
NPC’s controllable cost is assumed to decline, with the influence from the IPPs, as 
discussed later.    
 
Table 1 
Controllable cost of  the Generation Sector 
Items Sources and Details 
Controllable cost of the NPC As NPC accounts include its transmission sector, we subtracted the 
transmission and distribution cost components including associated 
manpower related costs.                                                    7
 Using up of mineral resources. 
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transmission and distribution cost components including associated 
manpower related costs.   
 
Controllable cost of  IPPs We obtained purchased power cost where this is identified separately in 
various unpublished documents of ADB, World Bank and the Energy 
Regulatory Board (ERB) to estimate controllable cost of IPP. 
 
Controllable cost of the NPC 
plants which would have been 
constructed instead of the IPP 
plants 
We used the data comparing BOT coal plants with NPC turn-key coal 
plants as reported by the World Bank in 1994 (World Bank, 1994b, 
Annex 21, p.1), and with a NPC coal plant called Masinloc (turn-key) 
from an ADB report of 1995 (ADB, 1995, app. 6, p.5). 
 
NPC and IPP generated units 
(KWh) 
We obtained NPC’s unpublished data on the actual generation data for 
NPC operated plants and IPP operated plants owned privately and owned 
by NPC for 1990-1999. 
 
5.2 Capital cost 
 
Next, we estimated the capital costs for each type of plant, as presented in Table 2.   It 
was found that, excluding interest charges, annual NPC project costs were lower than 
IPP project costs.  Assuming that the time taken for construction of NPC projects is 
the same as that of IPP, annual NPC project cost is about 96% of that of IPP.8  The 
reasons of the higher capital cost of IPP projects than NPC could be, due to the 
urgency to end the crisis, there were insufficient: (i) procurement time and procedures 
by NPC; (ii) time for the IPPs in specifying and costing equipment and technologies; 
and (iii) competition that may have inflated the project costs.  Also, this could be 
because: (i) most of the projects used a project financing method (off-balance sheet, 
non-recourse or limited recourse financing) which is riskier and more expensive (e.g., 
high interest rates and debt proportion, and short term repayment period unmatched to 
the plant life) than corporate balance sheet financing (see Clifford Chance, n.d.);  (ii) 
a lack of experience in project financing in the Philippines electricity sector might 
have taken even more preparation, transaction, adjustment and administrative costs; 
and (iii) the project cost data obtained may not include cost overruns.  After the crisis, 
the above situations were improved.  The prices and costs of post-crisis IPP project 
plants in the Philippines, are, on average, 12% lower than those of the initial IPP 
projects (World Bank, 1994a).   
 
Table 2 
                                                 
8
 An interest rate on project cost is assumed to be 12% in the IPP scenario and 7% in the NPC scenario.  
From 1999, an interest rate of the IPP scenario at 9.5% is assumed to reflect increased competition and 
better negotiation of NPC for IPP contracts.    
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Capital costs for IPP and NPC projects 
Items Sources and Details 
IPP project 
costs 
IPP project cost estimates were based on the published and unpublished data from the 
Philippines National Oil Company’s Energy Development Corporation (PNOC-EDC) 
(1998), Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) and World Bank reports, for data of a total of 
34 IPP projects for 1990-2001. For those IPP projects for which cost data were 
unavailable, we used the average cost of similar types of plants constructed elsewhere.  
 
NPC project 
costs 
To supplement the very few available data from NPC annual reports and development 
plans and in making future projections, we took data from a Financial Times (FT) 
publication (Daniel, 1997).  As many plants in the Philippines are constructed by 
international constructors, the use of such data was assumed to be appropriate in this 
study. 
 
5.3 Fuel cost 
 
Thirdly, we looked at the fuel cost as part of the examination of changes in investment 
cost.  Power purchase agreements (PPAs) between NPC and IPPs require NPC to 
supply expensive diesel oil and less expensive bunker C oil to IPPs, regardless of the 
fluctuations of oil prices and exchange rates and their contribution to higher air 
pollution, which lead to distortion of the least cost dispatch.  Based on an available 
data from NPC, the oil costs per KWh of land based and barge gas turbines are about 
1.97 and 2.29 times higher than those of other oil based plants on average during 
1993-1999 respectively.  The cost of coal was calculated from data obtained from 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), which is an economic cost, viz., cost, insurance and 
freight (CIF) price only at $34.2/metric ton in 1995, adjusted by relative movements 
in World Bank commodity price projections until 2022, and from 2022 to 2034 which 
is the year of termination of the last plants concerned, at a constant 2022 price (ADB, 
1995, p.41).    
 
5.4 Avoided cost 
 
The main benefit of partial restructuring of the generation sector is that IPPs solved 
the power crisis one year quicker than NPC alone could have done, due to financial 
and institutional constraints on NPC.  This one year generation gap between the IPP 
and NPC scenarios is an economic cost to the society arising from power shortages, 
which would have delayed economic recovery and growth, and development one year 
further.  This benefit is referred to as avoided cost, i.e., the cost to consumers in the 
absence of an adequate service, assuming that NPC would have been unable to 
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complete similar projects during the shortage period.  The avoided cost was derived 
from the World Bank estimation (in1994 prices: US$0. 43/KWh of lost output for 
1991-1993 and US$0.28/KWh for 1994 onward) (World Bank, 1994a).  This is 
derived from NPC’s estimate of US$0.50/KWh in 1994 prices for the gross economic 
cost of outages that the NPC uses in its planning process.  While further information 
and data on how the NPC and the World Bank arrived at these costs are not available, 
these estimates are quite conservative compared to other estimates for the Philippines 
and other countries (for review, e.g., Toba, 2002; Willis and Garrod, 1997).  
According to the World Bank, this was lower than the estimated outage cost in other 
developing countries, but it was consistent with the conditions predominant in the 
NPC’s power system.  This is because after a long period of unreliable service, 
consumers tended to be better prepared for outages and a large number of consumers 
have purchased a total of 1600 MW of generating sets as backup units during the 
crisis, thus reducing its impact.  On average, this avoided cost was 6.8 times the NPC 
wholesale tariff and 4.0 times the retail tariff (Meralco’s tariff) during 1990-1993 in 
real terms.9 
 
From 1994 onwards, a normal situation after the end of crisis, on average, this 
avoided cost is 4.6 times the NPC wholesale tariff and 2.7 times the retail tariff 
(Meralco’s tariff) during 1994-1997 in real terms.  This is the cost of best alternative 
energy supply of NPC instead of more expensive electricity supply from IPPs, 
estimated as the cost of alternative NPC projects implemented under a turn-key 
modality for construction and operation (World Bank, 1994a, p.44).  The power 
shortage in a normal situation would not have affected the society and economy so 
severely as minor brown and black outs occur in the Philippines even during the 
normal situation and people are get used to them.  From 1998 onwards, enough 
capacity and NPC’s capability to complete their projects on time were assumed so 
that there was no avoided cost.   
 
5.5 Externality cost 
 
                                                 
9
 NPC tariffs are taken from NPC annual reports and retail tariffs are taken from Meralco annual 
reports. 
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Concurrently, there are externalities arising from plant and fuel use and investment. In 
order to be consistent within the context of social cost benefit analysis differences in 
the environmental impact between the NPC and IPP scenarios need to be evaluated. 
This is especially important because the introduction of IPPs had negative 
environmental impacts. Most obvious are the air pollution effects.  Two different sets 
of air pollution data were used.  Pollution Data 1 (CO2, Particulates, SO2 and NOx) 
estimate air pollution costs of different types of plants per KWh in the Philippines, 
which were estimated by Logarta (1994) at 1993 cost levels.  Pollution Data 2, which 
were obtained from ADB, consist of CO2 and NOx emission costs and have been used 
to estimate emission costs of diesel fuel, bunker fuel and coal plants in this analysis.  
Pollution Data 2 provide average annual global climate change damages from carbon 
emissions as 1992 US$/ton of carbon emissions (ADB, 1996, app. H, pp.224-225).  
The NOx impacts (Premature respiratory 70%, Adult chronic morbidity 10%, 
Material soiling 10%, Acute morbidity 5%, and Visibility reduction 5%) were 
reported as their indirect effects because NOx emissions can contribute to impacts 
caused by ozone and fine particulates, which are formed by the release and 
transformation of NOx emissions.  Pollution Data 2 are chosen for the base analysis 
as they provide more information, and sensitivity analyses are performed using the 
other data set. 
 
5.6 Privatization and subsidization cost 
 
There are very limited data on the cost of privatization of NPC triggered by the 
introduction of IPPs.  However, privatization and subsidization cost was documented 
in the income statements of NPC annual reports from 1996.  This cost includes 
accelerated retirement benefits such as gratuity pay, terminal and accrued leaves, etc. 
and the expenses incurred by the Privatization and Restructuring External Office of 
NPC.  This data was available until 1999.  As projecting this cost is highly 
speculative, from 2000, an average cost of the available years was used for the 
projection ending in 2003.  
 
5.7 Consumer surplus 
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Detailed unpublished electricity price data were obtained from NPC, Energy 
Regulatory Board (ERB), Meralco, World Bank and ADB to calculate consumer 
surplus.  In 1995 automatic tariff adjustments on fuel and exchange rate fluctuations 
were implemented.  Since1996, ERB allowed NPC and the distribution sector to make 
a partial adjustment to their prices to reflect the fluctuation of power purchase costs.  
Until these automatic tariff adjustments were introduced in 1995, the NPC scenario is 
assumed to have the same tariff as in the IPP scenario.  From 1995, the counterfactual 
scenario’s retail electricity prices were based on estimates of NPC’s operating costs 
and the rates of return on assets that were obtained from its annual reports.  Up to 
1999 for which data were available, the actual rate of return was applied and from 
2000 a rate of return of 8% on asset base (the percentage required in compliance with 
the World Bank and ADBs’ loan covenant) was used.   
 
5.8 Government benefits 
 
Government benefits are represented by transfers to the Government.  As a 
government owned corporation, NPC’s net income was assumed to be a transfer to the 
Government.  Under the NPC scenario, transfers were measured using an actual net 
income return on rate base obtained from NPC’s annual reports.  Where actual rates 
were not available, it was assumed a return of 3% would be earned on the rate base, 
following trends of the past data.  Under the IPP scenario, an estimated corporate tax 
from IPPs was added in addition to an estimated NPC net income presented in its 
annual reports.  Earlier IPPs had income tax holidays for the first 7 years of operation 
and thus it was assumed that IPPs would pay an income tax accordingly.  It was 
assumed that from 2005, all IPPs would pay the tax.   
 
5.9 Private benefits 
 
Deriving from equation (2) in Section 4 on the SCBA Methodology, private (IPP) net 
benefits are the residual after subtracting the discounted consumer net benefits and 
government net benefits from total net benefits (∆W) excluding externalities.  Private 
profits are further allocated between foreign and domestic investors, assuming 75% of 
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the profit goes to foreign investors and 25% to domestic investors, as most of the IPP 
projects are financed from foreign sources. 
 
5.10 Employee benefits 
 
Since 1996, NPC has been downsizing its workforce in preparation for privatization 
through the Special Disengagement Plan.  NPC estimates that the proportion of  
casual workers with a college degree or vocational training is about 90%, and that 
they are likely to be able to find alternative employment.  No data are available on 
IPP employees.  Since the BOT Law of 1994 requires hiring of Philippines nationals 
where Philippines skills are available, any difference in the number of Philippines 
employees in the generation sector between the NPC and IPP scenarios would be 
insignificant.  For these reasons, there was assumed to be no gain or loss for 
employees between the two scenarios.   
 
6. Scenarios 
 
In undertaking the analyses, we made a number of different assumptions.  Here, we 
present the three most plausible cases, viz., Central case (our preference), Pro-IPP 
case, and Pro-NPC case.  Further, electricity retail prices are assumed to equalize at 
two dates, i.e., 2010 and 2020 for each case. 
Central case 
Restructuring and private sector participation (R&P) had effects which it is instructive 
to keep separate.  The direct impact was that IPPs contributed to the resolution of the 
Power Crisis.  Based on the available information we assume that the private sector’s 
efficiency and speedy fundraising process were effective in ending the crisis one year 
earlier than the NPC.   
 
The second effect was on the efficiency with which plants and fuels were used to 
generate electricity.  We assume that there would be differences in efficiency 
improvement between the NPC and IPP scenarios, as described in Table 3 and Figures 
1-3 below.  The plants operated by NPC were assumed to become more efficient due 
to the additional competitive pressures on NPC from the presence of IPPs, the 
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influence from IPPs’ efficient operation, the technology transfer from IPPs to NPC, 
and the privatization of NPC being scheduled (Government of the Philippines, 2001). 
 
The third effect was that R&P prevented least cost generation and fuel mix.  This is 
due to the power purchase agreements (PPAs) between NPC and IPPs, most of whose 
plants were expensive to operate such as gas turbine and diesel plants.  Further, high 
margins were allowed to cover capital recovery costs incurred by IPPs.  The patterns 
of generation dispatch, fuel use and investment were thus altered, generally increasing 
the costs of generating electricity.  Also, presuming that there would be no more 
Government guarantees for later projects, it is assumed that the private sector would 
construct coal plants that would have cheaper capital cost, instead of hydro and 
geothermal plants which would have lower operation and air pollution costs.  The 
final component of total effect is the impact of R&P on the environment – changes in 
fuel and plant type had a direct result in increasing emissions influencing climate 
change and human welfare.   
 
Pro-IPP case 
The only differences between the Central case and this Pro-IPP case are the 
assumptions of lower controllable cost and altered plant mix in the IPP scenario.  The 
mix is assumed to be environmentally less damaging and less threatening to the 
country’s energy security and foreign exchange exposure by making greater use of 
indigenous natural resources, reducing the Philippines’ heavy dependency on oil 
imports.  This is due to the assumptions of a highly effective regulatory regime to 
protect investors, competitive pressures from non-NPC’s IPPs, more technology 
transfer from IPPs and development of financial systems making it easy to obtain a 
large capital with long term financial instruments, which is needed for more 
environmental friendly electricity generation such as hydro, geothermal or other new 
and renewable energies.  Other assumptions remain the same as in the Central case.    
 
Pro-NPC case 
The Pro-NPC case assumes that the NPC scenario would have a lower controllable 
cost than in the other cases, and the same construction years and same commissioning 
year of rehabilitated and new plants as in the IPP scenario.  Other assumptions remain 
the same as in the Central case. Detailed assumptions for each case are presented in 
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Table 3, followed by the differences in controllable cost between the NPC and IPP 
scenarios in the three cases presented in Figures 1-3. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Assumptions for the three base cases 
Shared Assumptions 
Annual electricity sales growth rate: 1999-2010 8.2%; 2010-2020 5%; 2020-2030 3%; 2030- 1%. 
Controllable cost in 1994: NPC new plant 14.5% higher than IPPs.  
Central case: assumptions 
NPC scenario: 1995-2010, rehabilitated and new plants’ controllable cost decreases by 1% p.a. due to 
efficiency improvement until 1997 and thereafter both efficiency improvement and fuel mix change 
away from oil to more hydro and geothermal instead of coal.  1998-2010, NPC’s existing plants’ 
controllable cost decreases by 0.5% p.a.  One year delay in commissioning rehabilitated and new 
plants until 1999.   
IPP scenario:  1998-2010, rehabilitated and new plants’ controllable cost decreases by 1% p.a. due to 
efficiency improvement and fuel mix change away from oil to coal.  1998-2010, NPC’s existing 
plants’ controllable cost decreases by 1% p.a. 
 
Pro-IPP case: assumptions 
Same as in the Central case, except in IPP scenario, 1998-2010, rehabilitated and new plants’ 
controllable cost decreases by 1.5% p.a. due to efficiency improvement and fuel mix change away 
from oil to hydro and geothermal instead of coal.   
 
Pro-NPC case: assumptions 
NPC scenario: 1995-1997, rehabilitated and new plants’ controllable cost decreases by 1% due to 
efficiency improvement and 1998-2010 by 1.5% p.a. due to efficiency improvement and fuel mix 
change away from oil to more hydro and geothermal instead of coal.  No delay in commissioning 
rehabilitated and new plants.   
Both scenarios: 1998-2010, NPC’s existing plants’ controllable cost decreases by 0.5% p.a.  Other 
assumptions remain the same as in the Central case.   
0
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Fig. 1. Central case controllable cost (1988 prices) 
 
  21 
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
Ye a r
P
e
s
o
/K
W
h
NP C sc enario IP P  sc enario
 
Fig. 2. Pro-IPP case controllable cost (1988 prices) 
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Fig. 3. Pro-NPC case controllable cost (1988 prices)  
 
 
Each analysis used two public discount rates, viz., 15%, which is the normal real 
discount rate used for selecting public investments in the Philippines (World Bank, 
1994b, Annex 21, p.1), and following Newbery and Pollitt (1997),10% for sensitivity 
analysis.  All analyses were conducted in the 1988 peso prices and the base year of 
NPV is 2000.  All the results were thus in 1988 peso prices but were converted to 
1999 peso prices, and then 1999 US$ using nominal exchange rate (exchange rate 
US$1=P38.346 in 1999).  All the analyses were undertaken once more using the 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate (PPP exchange rate at US$1=9.96 in 
1998) in converting the data whose original values were in US dollars as a sensitivity 
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analysis.10  Here, all the results are presented in US$ 1999 prices unless otherwise 
noted.   
 
7. The Results 
 
7.1 Total net benefits 
 
The net impacts of R&P come from five sources – the investment including capital 
cost and fuel costs, the environmental cost, the efficiency gains in terms of reduced 
controllable cost and changes in plant use and mix, the avoided cost in quickly ending 
the Power Crisis, and the privatization and subsidization cost.  These are separately 
quantified in Table 4. 
 
The major sources of the net benefit of R&P were the avoided cost during the Power 
Crisis and the improvement in operating efficiency.  The net benefit was equivalent to 
an NPV of US$10.4 billion in the Central case and an NPV of US$11.8 billion in the 
Pro-IPP case.  These results may be compared with NPC’s debts in 2001 of US$10 
billion (2001 prices), 1999 net operating revenue of US$2.3 billion and net income of 
US$-155 million (1999 prices).  The air pollution costs are significant.  In the Pro-
NPC case, the net benefit becomes negative however.  This is an unlikely outcome 
because in practice NPC alone would not have been able to meet the required power 
demands.  As is clearly noted in an official report (PNOC-EDC, 1998, p.7), the 
introduction of IPPs and Government assumptions of all risks were rational responses 
to the Power Crisis and the Government guarantees were justified against NPC’s cost 
planning methodology and traditional financing options -- NPC estimated this as the 
least cost solution of the crisis.  Actually, our assumption of one year delay of NPC’s 
completion of new and rehabilitated plants were proved by the fact that over the past 
several years only minor generating plants were constructed by NPC and that NPC 
alone had no financial provision for constructing new plants and rehabilitation of 
                                                 
10
 Although no other country study comparable with our study exists so far to use our PPP exchange 
results, differences in the rate fluctuations between the official and PPP exchange rates could change 
the negative to positive results between the different exchange rates.  Actually, both exchange rates did 
not follow the same trends in the Philippines during the 1990s.  The official exchange rates fluctuated 
especially during the power crisis and at the Asian financial crisis of 1997, although in general, both 
exchange rates followed a positive linear path.  Also, using both exchange rates might indicate the 
relative magnitude of different results. 
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deteriorated plants by NPC around the time of power crisis.  IPPs proved that the 
private sector could mobilize funding faster than the government sector.  
 
Table 4 
Net Benefit of IPP participation (decimal points rounded) 
In US$ billion (1999 prices) Central Pro-IPP Pro-NPC 
Discount rate 15%  
Investment cost    
  Capital -2.0 -2.2 -0.7 
  Oil -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 
  Coal -0.1  -0.1 
Total investment cost savings -2.6 -2.7 -1.5 
    
Externality benefits 
Total pollution cost from Oil -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 
  CO2 (climate change) -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 
  NOx (human welfare) -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Total pollution cost from Coal -1.5  -1.5 
  CO2 (climate change) -1.1  -1.1 
  NOx (human welfare) -0.3  -0.3 
Total externality benefits -1.7 -0.3 -1.7 
    
Restructuring    
  Controllable cost 0.4 0.5 0.2 
  Avoided cost 14.5 14.5  
  Privatization & subsidization cost -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Total restructuring benefits 14.7 14.8 0.1 
    
Total net benefits    
  Excluding externalities and avoided cost -2.3 -2.4 -1.4 
  Including externalities and avoided cost 10.4 11.8 -3.1 
 
 
The contribution of avoided cost of US$14.5 billion in the Central and Pro-IPP case 
was very large.  In our estimation of the Philippines, the ratio of avoided cost per 
capita to GDP per capita is about 19%, based on the 1999 data (World Bank, 2002a) 
of US$76.2 billion GDP (1999 prices) and 74.2 millions total population.  The ratio of 
annual average avoided cost per capita to GDP per capita during 1991-1998 when the 
avoided costs were assumed and calculated, was 2.3% based on the 1999 data.  
However, this avoided cost may still a conservative measure, as according to Henisz 
and Zelner (2001), the loss due to the Power Crisis was estimated at US$20 billion by 
Private Finance International in 2000.  This was not an avoided cost, but was a loss 
even with IPPs' additional generation.  ADB (1998) reported that the Power Crisis 
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was one of the main reasons for the decline in the country’s GDP growth rate and that 
with the stabilization of the power situation the GDP growth rate increased.    
 
7.2 The distributional impact 
 
The resulting distributional impact from the net benefit excluding externalities on 
social welfare is shown in Table 5. 
 
 
           Table 5 
           Distributional benefit (decimal points rounded) 
In US$ billion (1999 prices) Central Pro-IPP Pro-NPC 
Discount rate 15%  
Net benefit (excl. externalities) 12.1 12.1 -1.4 
      
Case 1 prices converge in 2010 
     
Consumers 10.8 10.8 -3.7 
  Consumers Surplus -3.7 -3.7 -3.7 
  Avoided cost 14.5 14.5  
Government -1.5 -1.5 -1.1 
After tax profit, of which: 2.8 2.8 3.4 
  Foreign 75% 2.1 2.1 2.6 
  Domestic 25% 0.7 0.7 0.9 
    
Global Social welfare 12.1 12.1 -1.4 
Domestic social welfare 10.0 10.0 -3.9 
      
Case 2 prices converge in 2020 
     
Consumers 9.2 9.2 -5.2 
  Consumers Surplus -5.2 -5.2 -5.2 
  Avoided cost 14.5 14.5  
Government -1.5 -1.5 -1.1 
After tax profits, of which: 4.4 4.4 5.0 
  Foreign 75% 3.3 3.3 3.7 
  Domestic 25% 1.1 1.1 1.2 
    
Global social welfare 12.1 12.1 -1.4 
Domestic social welfare 8.8 8.8 -5.1 
 
Our results show that except in the Pro-NPC case, consumers most benefit, largely 
due to the avoided cost.  We note that an inclusion of the avoided cost captures some 
general equilibrium effects.  Foreign and domestic investors also benefit, with 75% of 
this benefit accruing to the foreign investors.  While the Government is a loser, with 
possibilities of divestiture in the future and increased corporate income tax collection 
from IPPs, Government could gain more.  The case 2 prices converge in 2020 is less 
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favourable to consumers and more favourable to private investors than the case 1 
prices converge in 2010, resulting in a decreased domestic social welfare.  Our 
preferred assumptions are for the Central case with prices converging in 2010.  This is 
because we anticipate that the Government would take appropriate measures such as a 
lifeline rate11 to protect vulnerable consumers from higher tariff and because not 
defaulting on the even more expensive PPAs due to the Asian crisis of 1997 may have 
strengthened the credibility of the Philippines institutional frameworks, increasing 
investors’ confidence in the Philippines investment environment that would attract 
more investors and thus promote cheaper, more competitive, and increased investment 
flows, supporting the further electricity sector reform and eventual benefits to the 
economy and welfare of the Philippines society.  The resultant gain in global social 
welfare was equivalent to an NPV of US$12.1 billion and in domestic social welfare 
to an NPV of US$10 billion. 
 
7.3 Sensitivity analyses 
 
We have experimented with numerous sensitivity analyses for each of the three cases 
presented in Tables 4 and 5.  Further variations of the Central case are presented in 
Tables 6 - 8.  Tables 6 shows the sensitivity analysis of the net benefit.   
 
The left hand side of the first panel shows the base case, with 15% public discount 
rate and using Pollution Data 2, as discussed above.  From the second column to the 
fourth column, all the assumptions remain the same as in the base case except a few 
changes as follows.  In the second column of the panel, a 10% discount rate was used.  
In the third columns, Pollution Data 1 were used.  In the fourth column, we used 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate in converting the data originally 
denominated in US dollars during the analyses, but when converting the final results 
from original peso result to US dollars, we used the nominal exchange rate.   
 
                                                 
11
 Lifeline rate is a subsidized electricity price for lower income consumers for a certain block of 
electricity consumption.  The Republic Act 9136 section 73 (Electric Power Industry Reforms Act of 
2001) states that “a lifeline rate for the marginalized end-users shall be set by the Energy Regulatory 
Commission, which shall be exempted from the cross subsidy phase-out under this Act for a period of 
ten years, unless extended by law” (Government of the Philippines, 2001). 
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Change in discount rate to 10% from 15% makes noticeable differences in net 
benefits.  Also, the use of different pollution data makes differences in externalities 
depending on valuation methods and coverage of impacts included.  The use of PPP 
exchange rates makes significant differences in the outcomes, which could be very 
important for developing countries with a significant share of informal economy 
against formal economy such as the Philippines.  To be conservative, we would still 
prefer the base case, because (i) the 15% discount rate is officially used by the 
Philippine government, (ii) the pollution data source 2 has more information on the 
data backgrounds and (iii) it is difficult to estimate accurate Purchasing Power Parity 
exchange rates with a reasonable confidence.   
 
Table 6 
Net Benefit of IPP participation   Central case Sensitivity analyses (decimal points rounded) 
In US$ billion (1999 prices)  1 (base) 2 3 4 
 15% d. r., 
pol.  2 
10% 
dis. rate 
Pol. 1 PPPex.  
Investment cost       
  Capital -2.0 -1.1 -2.0 -0.6 
  Oil -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 -0.6 
  Coal -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 
Total investment cost savings -2.6 -1.8 -2.6 -1.2 
      
Externality benefits     
  Total cost from Oil -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 
        CO2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 
        NOx -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 
        Particulates   0.0  
        SO2   -0.1  
  Total cost from Coal -1.5 -2.8 -0.1 -0.4 
        CO2 -1.1 -2.1 0.0 -0.3 
        NOx -0.3 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 
        Particulates   0.0  
        SO2   0.0  
Total externality benefits -1.7 -3.0 -0.4 -0.4 
      
Restructuring     
Controllable cost 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.3 
Avoided cost 14.5 11.2 14.5 0.9 
Privatization & subsidization cost -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Total restructuring benefits 14.7 11.8 14.7 1.1 
      
Total net benefits     
  excl. externalities and avoided cost -2.3 -1.3 -2.3 -0.9 
  incl. externalities and avoided cost 10.4 6.9 11.7 -0.5 
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The sensitivity analysis of the distributional benefit in Table 7 follows the same 
variations as above, except that there is no column on pollution data variation, as 
externalities are not included in the distributional benefit analysis.  The overall 
comments are generally the same above and we still prefer the base case. 
 
 
    Table 7 
    Distributional Benefit Central Case Sensitivity Analysis (decimal points rounded) 
In US$ billion (1999 
prices) 
Base case 15% 
discount rate 
10% discount 
rate 
PPP 
exchange  
  Net benefit (excl. extern.) 12.1 9.9 -0.1 
         
Case 1 prices converge in 2010
     
Consumers 10.8 7.6 -2.8 
  Consumers Surplus -3.7 -3.7 -3.7 
  Avoided cost 14.5 11.2 0.9 
Government -1.5 -0.1 -1.5 
After tax profit, of which: 2.8 2.5 4.2 
  Foreign 75% 2.1 1.9 3.2 
  Domestic 25% 0.7 0.6 1.1 
        
Global social welfare 12.1 9.9 -0.1 
Domestic social welfare 10.0 8.1 -3.2 
         
Case 2 prices converge in 2020
       
Consumers 9.2 5.3 -4.3 
  Consumers Surplus -5.2 -5.9 -5.2 
  Avoided cost 14.5 11.2 0.9 
Government -1.5 -0.1 -1.5 
After tax profit, of which: 4.4 4.8 5.8 
  Foreign 75% 3.3 3.6 4.3 
  Domestic 25% 1.1 1.2 1.4 
        
Global social welfare 12.1 9.9 -0.1 
Domestic social welfare 8.8 6.4 -4.4 
 
 
The sensitivity analysis applying different social weights to the distributional benefit 
is presented in Table 8.  The social weights set 1 (NP) was estimated based on the UK 
(Newbery and Pollitt, 1997), a developed economy, which was derived from a study 
by Newbery (1995).  In the study, social weights of Hungary, a less developed and 
former communist economy, were also estimated and the estimates were not 
significantly different from those of the UK in the study.  This suggests that the social 
weights of the Philippines also might not considerably differ from those of UK but 
this might still need verification.  The social weights set 2 (B) was estimated based on 
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the Philippines, but the original data was published in 1976 (Bruce, 1976, cited in 
Jones, et al., 1990), with our adjustments using the recent available data.  Although 
the current Philippine economy has developed since 1976, we assume that the basic 
economic and social structure of the Philippines has not changed significantly, which 
is dominated by a small elite and has a large gap between the rich and poor.  Thus, 
social weights set 2 could be still applicable to this analysis.   
 
Table 8 
Central case Distributional Benefits with social weights (decimal points rounded) 
In US$ billions (1999 
prices) 
Discount rate 15% 
No 
social 
weights 
Social 
weights 
1 (NP) 
 Social 
weights 
2 (B) 
 
 Net benefit (excl. 
externalities) 
12.1   12.1   12.1 
              
Case 1 prices converge in 2010 
           
Consumers 10.8 0.975 10.5 0.33 3.6 
  Consumers Surplus -3.7 0.975 -3.6 0.33 
-1.2 
  Avoided cost 14.5 0.975 14.1 0.33 4.8 
Government -1.5 1 -1.5 1 
-1.5 
After tax profit, of which: 2.8 0.5 1.4 0.65 1.8 
  Foreign 75% 2.1 0.5 1.1 0.65 1.4 
  Domestic 25% 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.65 0.5 
     
  
 
  
   
Global Social welfare 12.1   10.4   3.9 
Domestic social welfare 10.0   9.4   2.5 
     
  
 
  
   
Case 2 prices converge in 2020 
    
  
  
  
 
Consumers 9.2 0.975 9.0 0.33 3.1 
  Consumers Surplus -5.2 0.975 
-5.1 0.33 
-1.7 
  Avoided cost 14.5 0.975 14.1 0.33 4.8 
Government -1.5 1 
-1.5 1 
-1.5 
After tax profits, of which: 4.4 0.5 2.2 0.65 2.8 
  Foreign 75% 3.3 0.5 1.6 0.65 2.1 
  Domestic 25% 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.65 0.7 
     
  
 
  
   
Global social welfare 12.1   9.7   4.4 
Domestic social welfare 8.8   8.0   2.3 
 
The social weights set 1 regards the values of public money and input as the same as 
the printed value of currency by weighting as 1; the value of money to consumer as 
consisting of half consumption (its weight as 0.95) and half inputs to production (its 
weight as 1) by weighting as 0.975; and the value of private investors’ money as half 
the printed value of currency by weighting as 0.5 assuming private investors are 
wealthier.  On the other hand, social weights set 2 was estimated in a much broader 
and extended scope.  This considers multiplier effects of public and private 
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investments into the Philippine economy, by putting more weight on public (its 
weight as 3) and private investors’ (its weight as 1.94) money than the printed value 
of currency.  The money of the consumers is valued as the same as the printed value 
of currency.   A questionable issue in determining social weights set 2 is whether 
private investors’ money, especially that of global investors, would be reinvested into 
the Philippine economy.  If, for example, global investors reinvest into the US, the 
social weight could have a different value.   
 
To compare the results from different sets of social weights, we need to choose the 
same numeraire among them.  Since we evaluate welfare impacts from the point of 
view of the Government as policy decision maker, we chose the Government as 
numeraire.  Accordingly, social weights set 2 was adjusted (i.e., changed  the social 
weights of Government  to 1, consumers to 0.33 and private investors to 0.65) .  The 
results show the significantly different results depending on the sources of social 
weights with different assumptions.  Compared to the results without social weights, 
the use of social weights set 1 makes social welfare lower and the private benefit is 
reduced by half.  In contrast, the use of social weights set 2 significantly reduces 
social welfare compared to the unweighted results -- consumers’ benefit is reduced to 
one third, and private benefit decreases to about two third.  It should be noted 
however, if we choose consumers as numeraire, compared to the unweighted results, 
global social welfare with the use of social weights set 2 does not change so 
significantly, being reduced by a small amount to become US$11.8 billion and 
domestic social welfare decreases to US$7.6 billion (for example, in the Case 1 prices 
converge in 2010) -- Government loses three times more and private investors gain 
about a little less than two times.  Due to the uncertainties in estimating values of the 
social weights above, we still prefer the conservative results without social weights.   
 
These tables illustrate that the choice of discount rate, the choice and use of exchange 
rates, the choice of emission values and the choice of social weights can change the 
estimated benefit and cost dramatically. This alerts us to the need to be careful in 
making assumptions and choosing data and in interpreting the results.  Choice of 
which of the results to be preferred seems to depend on the assumptions, scope, 
coverage and time span of the social welfare impacts that the decision maker has in 
mind.   
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8. Conclusions 
 
We have estimated the cost and benefit from the introduction of IPPs in the 
Philippines, making various assumptions about what might have happened had IPPs 
not been introduced in the generation sector and what might happen in the future.  We 
found that the main gains came from two sources.  One is the avoided cost during the 
Power Crisis, which promoted economic growth and social development and may 
have even saved lives by restoring vital social services such as water and sanitation.  
The other is the efficiency gains in generation, arising from the additional competitive 
pressures on NPC from the presence of IPPs, the IPPs’ efficient operation and 
technology transfer to NPC, and the  privatization of NPC under preparation 
(Government of the Philippines, 2001).  Only about one quarter of the total private 
investors’ gain is transferred to the domestic investors, as most of the investors are 
assumed to be foreigners.  Further sensitivity analyses indicate the need for some 
caution in choosing data and making assumptions. 
 
We conclude that the Philippines’ partial electricity sector reform through IPPs was a 
good option available considering all the circumstances at that time such as the Power 
Crisis and the limitation of institutional backgrounds, including the regulatory 
capabilities and the financial system.  This fact is proved by our social-cost benefit 
analysis which indicates that consumers were large net gainers.  Our  analysis, of 
course, does not imply that introduction of IPPs is the only solution to power 
shortages in developing countries. It may well have been the case that freeing up NPC 
from financial constraints, without IPPs, would have been equally successful. As with 
all real world analyses of the impact of liberalisation it is impossible to distinguish 
between impacts of the various elements of a reform when the elements are 
introduced simultaneously. However we can still use social cost benefit analysis to 
suggest that the reform package as compared with a business-as-usual scenario was 
successful. 
 
Can electricity sector reform and private sector participation/ownership increase 
social welfare?   Based on our analyses of the Philippines electricity generation sector, 
our answer would be affirmative. We believe that this could be true in other 
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economies, especially in those experiencing a large capacity shortage, because private 
enterprises could mobilize funding and could deliver faster, and could be more 
efficient than government owned enterprises.  As many as 2.5 billion people in the 
world are estimated to still remain without access to modern energy supplies (World 
Bank, 2002b).  This could mean that a significant capacity shortage in the world 
continues and private enterprises could contribute to filling the gap of unmet demand 
for electricity and thereby prompting the global economic and social development and 
welfare.  
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